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This book is a collection of 13 essays on the economics of property rights. The essays have been 
grouped in six parts, each of which begins with a short introduction by the editors. In the first part, 
Edwin West surveys the historical background of the concept of property rights. Yoram Barzel 
discusses the literature on property rights within business firms. In the second part, Thráinn 
Eggertsson explains the well-known economic consequences of open access, known as "tragedy of the 
commons". Louis De Alessi summarizes empirical studies on overexploitation of resources. In the 
third part, Terry Anderson and Peter Hill explain the evolution of private property in America's 
nineteenth-century West. Gary Libecap illustrates private contracting for property rights with case 
studies on the Brazilian Amazon and North American oil fields. David Haddock discusses how force 
and threat can be used by private parties to define and protect property rights.  
In part IV, Dean Lueck examines several applications of legal first possession rules to establish 
property rights. Fred McChesney points out that the government can define and enforce property 
rights to prevent the tragedy of the commons, but it can also use its coercive power to create new 
inefficiencies. In part V, Bruce Yandle compares Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining as 
alternative means to solve the externality problem caused by pollution. Harold Demsetz argues that 
externalities between two firms could be eliminated if they integrated into a single firm. Finally, in 
part VI Richard Epstein discusses several cases regarding the government taking of private property 
for public use. William Fischel addresses the issue of regulatory takings in the context of zoning.  
 
The book is a very interesting and accessible introduction to selected topics that have been addressed 
in the literature on property rights. Hardly any knowledge of economic theory is required to 
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understand the text. There is no formal analysis, even though some simple formulae could have 
significantly streamlined and clarified the discussion in several instances. For example, the 
explanation of the overfishing problem on pp. 61-68 (including two tables with numerical examples) is 
quite cumbersome and could be made precise in a few lines using first-order conditions. When the 
authors speak of a "model" (e.g., see chapter 9), they usually mean a figure showing a marginal cost 
and a marginal benefit curve. Of course, this falls short of what economists usually call a model. To be 
sure, the insight that marginal benefits and marginal costs can be decisive is an important achievement 
of economics, and for legal scholars this might still be a new way to frame problems. However, in the 
last decades substantial progress has been made in economic theory. In particular, powerful game-
theoretic tools have been developed in information economics and the theory of economic incentives, 
which are relevant to the property rights issues but unfortunately are hardly used in the present book. 
Moral hazard (hidden action, hidden information), adverse selection, the hold-up problem, and 
incomplete contracting are obviously among the main economic characteristics of most topics 
addressed in the book. Unfortunately, there is no systematic treatment of the topics in the light of such 
well-known categories.  
The words "free riding" and "prisoners' dilemma" occur for the first time on p. 147, even though the 
underlying ideas have been explained before. Indeed, the same ideas and the same examples are 
repeated in several chapters over and over again (which might be due to the fact that the chapters have 
been written by different authors). For instance, the "fast-fish loose-fish" rule and the "iron-holds-the-
whale" rule that were used to resolve disputes in nineteenth-century Atlantic whaling are described in 
chapter 4 and again in chapter 5 and again in chapter 8. Most of the book is mainly descriptive. It is 
true that many of the examples and anecdotes are interesting. E.g., in chapter 4 we learn about beavers, 
elephants, shrimps, oysters, alligators, halibut, and arctic explorations. The stories about the American 
West, ranchers, cattlemen's associations, and gold mining in chapters 5, 7, and 9 are not quite as 
entertaining as a John Wayne movie, but still a joy to read. Yet, while these descriptions are 
interesting, the analysis is usually not very deep. One problem with a purely verbal analysis is that the 
assumptions that underlie the claimed conclusions are not made crystal clear. To be sure, many 
conjectures sound quite reasonable, even when they are only derived by hand-waiving. Nevertheless, 
economists who are not satisfied with statements that seem to be in accordance with common sense 
might prefer to see more precise arguments that could be transformed into formal economic models. 
A major shortcoming of the book is the fact that much of the modern literature on property rights has 
simply been neglected. When speaking about the "property rights approach" or "the theory of the 
firm", today many economists refer to the seminal contributions of Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart and Moore (1990), as summarized by Hart (1995). The latter two references are not even 
mentioned in the book. Grossman and Hart's (1986) model is only mentioned in a short footnote in 
chapter 2, where the author says that he discusses their model "in other articles" (no references are 
provided). To be sure, there are many ways in which the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework can be 
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criticized. However, I think it is inappropriate to simply ignore their approach altogether. If this book 
is supposed to be a primer on the economics of property rights (it says so on the back cover), then it 
should at least prepare the reader for the models that he or she will find on this topic in today's 
mainstream journals.  
In one of the most interesting and lively chapters of the book, Pigouvian command-and-control 
solutions of the externality problem are contrasted with Coasean bargaining (chapter 10). As is well 
known, Pigou pointed out the possibility to internalize external effects with the help of governmental 
interventions. Yet, it is emphasized here that Pigou also doubted that any public authority would 
whole-heartedly seek that ideal, due to ignorance and corruption by private interest. On the other hand, 
as is well known, Coase emphasized that external effects could be internalized when the involved 
parties bargain with each other, provided that transaction costs are negligible. Yet, Coase has also 
made clear that in the presence of high transaction costs, it is possible that government actions may 
produce better results than negotiations between individuals in the market. In practice, fear of common 
law suits and investor punishment, eco-labeling of consumer products, or even the fact that factory 
managers "generally live in the vicinity of the factory" might help to reduce pollution, as is argued in 
chapter 10. However, I think that there may be quite some wishful thinking involved here.  
When the numbers of polluters and potential victims are large (think of automobile drivers), I cannot 
see any practical alternative to taxation. Indeed, Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) have 
shown that bargaining between many agents over the provision of public goods cannot be successful 
in the presence of asymmetric information. A benevolent dictator could clearly achieve more. Of 
course, a real-world government is not benevolent. Yet, if the possibility of welfare-improving 
intervention is simply rejected, then this seems to be based on ideology, not on economic analysis. In 
any case, the recognition that "people, not nature, hold rights that must be protected" (p. 264) points to 
one problem that is usually overlooked in the Pigou/Coase debate. Pollution often affects future 
generations. People who are not yet borne cannot participate in Coasean bargaining and they cannot 
buy certificates. Of course, it is unclear whether politicians who are mainly interested in the coming 
elections have any incentives to consider long-run effects. In this context, it is interesting to recall how 
legislation created what is now the Yellowstone National Park (see chapter 5, and the discussion of the 
role that has been played by lobbying efforts of the Northern Pacific Railroad).  
The second chapter on externalities (chapter 11) may also lead to controversial discussions. As an 
illustration, consider two parties, A and B, who choose activity levels x≥0 and y≥0, respectively. Let 
the payoffs of the two parties be given by the concave functions A(x,y) and B(x,y), where Ax>0, Ay<0, 
Bx<0, By>0; i.e., the parties' activities have negative external effects. The Coase Theorem says that in 
the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter whether A can insist on y=0 (regime I) or whether 
B can insist on x=0 (regime II). The parties will always agree on the first-best levels of x and y that 
maximize A(x,y)+B(x,y). If the bargaining costs are prohibitively high, then in property rights regime 
I, y=0 and x maximizes A(x,0), while in regime II, x=0 and y maximizes B(0,y). Whether regime I or 
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regime II leads to a larger total surplus then depends on the functional forms. In chapter 11 it is now 
argued that integration of A and B in one firm would eliminate the externalities, implying that x and y 
would be chosen in order to maximize A(x,y)+B(x,y).  
This example nicely illustrates several problems. The term "integration" is used here in the sense of 
the industrial organization tradition. As has been pointed out by Tirole (1988, p. 170), the term 
integration for the benchmark solution is misleading. On the one hand, the benchmark solution might 
be achieved by contracting between independently owned firms. On the other hand, it is not obvious 
why incentive problems should disappear when the ownership structure is changed. If party A and 
party B are needed to choose x and y (assume that they have unique human capital), all that is changed 
by integration might be what would happen if bargaining between the two parties failed – this is 
precisely the point of view adopted by Grossman and Hart (1986). Moreover, the example illustrates 
that we must be precise about the information structure. If x and y are verifiable, the first-best solution 
can clearly be achieved. Yet, x and y may be hidden actions or they might be observable (by the 
parties) but unverifiable (by the court). In the latter case, the analysis will depend upon whether or not 
renegotiation can be ruled out. Alternatively, the parties A and B might have pre-contractual private 
information (it is not obvious how this could be changed by integration). For example, the payoffs 
may be A(x,y,θA) and B(x,y,θB), where only A knows the realization of the random variable θA and 
only B knows the realization of θB. In the latter case, the findings of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) 
imply that it might be impossible to achieve the first-best solution by voluntary bargaining. The 
government could implement the first-best solution, because it has coercive power and can violate the 
parties' participation constraints. Of course, whether or not the government will do so depends on its 
objective function.  
 
To conclude, this book (which has a beautiful front cover) contains a number of interesting anecdotes 
and case studies related to the economic theory of property rights. Several topics are omitted. Leasing, 
franchising, licensing, employee-owned firms, cooperatives, nonprofit firms, and many other issues 
are not mentioned in the book. Privatization is briefly mentioned, but the relevant literature is not 
discussed at all. Consistent with the critical view of the state, it is argued that the government might 
not privatize enough (p. 246), even though some observers may think that blackouts in North America 
and train accidents in Europe could have been avoided if there had been less privatization. The 
economic methodology used throughout the book is elementary, so that legal scholars without prior 
knowledge in economics will encounter no obstacles. Economists who are interested in the recent 
literature and formal models might be less satisfied. When theoretical concepts are mentioned, this is 
often done in an imprecise way (e.g. "tit-for-tat or other games", p. 188), the underlying assumptions 
are not mentioned (e.g. why are contracts only bilateral on p. 232), or standard results are ignored 
(e.g., in contrast to what is said on p. 340, it is well-known that in profit-maximizing auctions the 
seller should discriminate against stronger bidders; see Myerson, 1981).  However, I can recommend 
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the book to economists who are looking for interesting stories, thought-provoking arguments, and 
valuable summaries of the history of economic thought with regard to property rights.  
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